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1. Introduction 
It appears that many philosophers are often bedazzled by complex arguments. They admire the 
depth and complexity of a philosopher’s arguments even though, when pressed, they might admit 
that the philosopher’s arguments are often not of the highest argumentative standard. This is the 
impression one gets when it is said with approval of philosophy in general that it is “difficult” 
(Protevi 2001, p. 150), “hard” (Craig 2002, p. 100), or “complicated” (LeBon 1999, p. 17), and 
of particular philosophers, like Nietzsche and Hegel, that their “philosophy [is] hard to 
understand” (Danto 2005, p. 79) or “difficult” (Wood 2004, p. 197).1 As Kelly (2011, p. 106) 
puts it: 
To this day, great philosophers who embraced strange conclusions are praised in eulogies 
for their willingness to follow the argument where it leads, and the ideal is mentioned in 
faculty handbooks in the context of discussions of academic freedom. 
I think that this is a mistake. That is to say, I think that, instead of admiring complexity in 
philosophical argumentation, we should prefer simplicity. In this paper, then, I argue that, other 
things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, if our goal in putting forth 
arguments is truth, or at least rational persuasion, then we should prefer simpler arguments, other 
things being equal.2 
                                                          
1 It is also worth noting that, against the attempt by some, like Simon Blackburn, to make philosophy public, i.e., 
more accessible to a general audience, others have argued that “philosophy is supposed to be difficult” 
(http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/feb/25/philosophy-technical-everyday-english). 
2 On the use of arguments as tools of rational persuasion, see Hitchcock (2007), Johnson (2000), and Walton (1996). 
The notion of rational persuasion is supposed to exclude other forms of persuasion, such as threats and other kinds 
of blackmail. This is also meant to deal with alleged counterexamples where it seems rational to prefer complex 
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As far as arguments are concerned, it is common practice to distinguish between at least 
two kinds: deductive and inductive (i.e., non-deductive) arguments (see, e.g., Copi and Cohen 
2005; Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010). The premises of a valid deductive argument, if true, 
necessitate the truth of the conclusion. Hence, valid deductive arguments can be represented as 
follows: 
 (Deduction) IF {Premise1, Premise2,…, Premisen} THEN necessarily {Conclusion} 
The premises of a strong inductive argument, if true, make the truth of the conclusion more 
probable, i.e., P(Conclusion | Premises) > P(¬Conclusion | Premises), but not guaranteed.3 Hence, 
strong inductive arguments can be represented as follows4: 
 (Induction) IF {Premise1, Premise2,…, Premisen} THEN probably {Conclusion} 
With these basic characterizations of deductive and inductive arguments, I will argue in what 
follows that, of two competing arguments (either deductive or inductive), we should prefer the 
simpler one, other things being equal. 
Here is how I plan to proceed. In Section 2, I discuss two varieties of simplicity, namely 
syntactic simplicity (or elegance) and ontological simplicity (or parsimony). In Section 3, I 
sketch an argument from mathematical proofs for the claim that, other things being equal, 
simpler arguments are better. In Section 4, I sketch an argument from scientific theories for the 
claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In Section 5, I sketch an 
argument from the conjunction rule for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler 
arguments are better. 
 
2. Two varieties of simplicity 
Before I sketch my arguments for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are 
better, a few clarifications are in order. More specifically, I need to explain in more detail what is 
meant by simplicity. Philosophers usually identify two varieties of simplicity. In this section, I 
discuss these two varieties of simplicity. I am not concerned with the justification of simplicity 
principles.5 Rather, I am concerned with simplicity as a theoretical virtue of arguments.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
arguments. For example, suppose that an eccentric billionaire offers a cash prize for “Most Complex Argument.” In 
this case, it seems rational to prefer more complex arguments, not for the sake of truth and/or rational persuasion, 
but rather for the sake of winning a cash prize. Thanks to Andrew Aberdein for this point. 
3 Discussing the various concepts of probability and their interpretations is beyond the scope of this paper. For a 
useful overview, see Mellor (2005). 
4 Note that this characterization of inductive arguments is broad enough to include non-deductive arguments like 
abductive arguments (or inferences to the best explanation) and conductive arguments (Govier 2010). For a useful 
overview, see McKeon (2013). 
5 See, e.g., Sober (1988) and (1994). Sober argues that appeals to simplicity are local rather than global, i.e., they 
depend on local background assumptions and context for their rational justification. 
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2a. Syntactic simplicity 
According to Sober (1988), considerations of simplicity play a role in the so-called “curve-fitting 
problem.” To use Sober’s (1998) example, suppose that scientists want to discover general 
relations that might hold between independent variable x and dependent variable y. They gather 
the following set of observations, depicted as points in Figure 1 (adapted from Sober 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Curve-fitting and goodness-of-fit adapted from Sober (1998). 
 
 
They then evaluate competing hypotheses, A, B, and C, depicted as curves in Figure 1. In cases 
such as this one, given that the possibility of error is taken into account, the standard scientific 
practice, according to Sober (1998, p. 781), is to use the notion of “goodness-of-fit.” For 
example, for each data point on curve A, the scientists compute the squared distance from the 
observed y-value to the y-value that curve A predicts. In this way, the “sum of squares” (SOS) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 In this paper, I talk about simplicity as a theoretical virtue of arguments in much the same way that simplicity is 
taken to be a theoretical virtue of mathematical proofs and scientific theories. See, e.g., Baker (2011), Glynn (2010), 
and Sober (2001). On the virtues of arguers, rather than arguments, see Aberdein (2010). 
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measures how far the curve is from the data points. If SOS measures how well the data support 
the curve in question, then the data support curve A better than they support curve B. As Sober 
(1998, p. 781) puts it: 
Curves that are close to the data are more likely, in the technical sense defined by R. A. 
Fisher (1925). Curve A is more likely than Curve B (given standard assumptions about 
the probability of error) because A confers on the data a higher probability than B does: 
P(Data | Curve A) > P(Data | Curve B).7 
At this point, simplicity becomes relevant, since curve A and curve C have the same SOS values. 
If the scientists are guided by considerations of simplicity, they will choose curve A over curve C, 
for curve A is smooth, whereas curve C is bumpy. As Sober (1998, p. 781) puts it, “Curve A 
seems more simple.” In other words, curve A posits a simpler relationship between variables x 
and y than curve C does, and is thus preferable to curve C.8 
This variety of simplicity, then, has to do with the number and complexity of hypotheses. 
As Baker (2011), puts it, “Syntactic simplicity, or elegance, measures the number and 
conciseness of the theory’s basic principles.” More explicitly: 
(Elegance)  Other things being equal, if T1 is more syntactically simple than T2, then it 
is rational to prefer T1 over T2. 
As Gauch (2003, p. 270) notes, this is an epistemological conception of simplicity. 
2b. Ontological simplicity 
Another variety of simplicity has to do with the number and complexity of postulated entities 
rather than hypotheses. Ockham’s razor is perhaps the most famous formulation of this variety of 
simplicity. 
(Ockham’s razor) Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. 
As Gauch (2003, p. 270) notes, this is an ontological conception of simplicity, which is also 
known as the principle of parsimony. According to the principle of parsimony, hypotheses that 
postulate fewer entities, causes, and/or processes are better than hypotheses that postulate more.9 
                                                          
7 Note that this is different from saying that curve A is more probable, i.e., that P(Curve A | Data) > P(Curve B | 
Data). 
8 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, the assumption that smoothness is simpler than bumpiness can 
be operationalized in several ways. For example, the degree of a polynomial can be taken to indicate the number of 
bumps of the associated graph, in which case, a low degree is preferable to a high degree polynomial. As Armitage 
et al (2002, p. 378) put it: “Considerations of simplicity suggest that as low an order as possible should be used; for 
example, we should normally use linear regression unless there is any particular reason to use a higher-degree 
polynomial.” 
9 See also Sober (2001, p. 14) who calls this variety of simplicity “semantic simplicity.” 
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As a principle of theory choice, then, the principle of parsimony states that, other things 
being equal, it is rational to prefer a theory that commits us to a limited ontology. More precisely: 
(Parsimony) Other things being equal, if T1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T2, 
then it is rational to prefer T1 over T2. 
According to this principle, if a theory, T1, has all the ontological commitments of a competing 
theory, T2, but T2 is also ontologically committed to Fs, whereas T1 is not, then T1 is more 
ontologically parsimonious than T2. Thus the notion of ontological parsimony is usually cashed 
out in terms of Quine’s notion of ontological commitment. According to Quine (1981, p. 144), T 
is ontologically committed to Fs if and only if T entails that Fs exist.10 
Like (Elegance), (Parsimony) is also a principle of theory choice. That is, (Elegance) 
states that, of two competing theories, we should choose the syntactically simpler one, other 
things being equal. Likewise, (Parsimony) states that, of two competing theories, we should 
choose the semantically simpler one, other things being equal. Einstein is said to have made a 
similar point by saying that “things should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” 
According to Norman (2011, p. 50), what Einstein actually said was that “the grand aim of all 
science … is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deductions from 
the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms.” Accordingly, simplicity is a relative 
property; a theory is simple only relative to another competing theory. 
Applied to arguments, (Elegance) and (Parsimony) state that, of two competing 
arguments, we should prefer the simpler one, other things being equal. More explicitly, 
(Elegance) states that, of two competing arguments, we should choose the syntactically simpler 
one (i.e., the one with fewer inferences), other things being equal. Likewise, (Parsimony) states 
that, of two competing arguments, we should choose the semantically simpler one (i.e., the one 
with fewer premises), other things being equal. With these syntactic, i.e., (Elegance), and 
semantic or ontological, i.e., (Parsimony), conceptions of simplicity in hand, I now turn to my 
arguments for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. I outline 
three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument 
from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule. 
 
3. An argument from mathematical proofs 
My first argument for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better is an 
argument from mathematical proofs. The argument runs as follows: 
(1.1) If, other things being equal, simpler mathematical proofs are better, then, other 
things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 
(1.2) Other things being equal, simpler mathematical proofs are better. 
                                                          
10 In terms of ontological parsimony, a further distinction is often drawn between qualitative parsimony (the number 
of types of entities postulated) and quantitative parsimony (the number of individual entities postulated). See Baker 
(2003). 
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Therefore, 
(1.3) Other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 
In support of (1.2), consider what Russell (1918, p. 60) says about mathematics: 
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty — a beauty 
cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, 
without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a 
stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show.11 
In general, mathematicians prefer mathematical proofs that are elegant and simple. For example 
(emphasis added): 
Here we want to discuss another bijection proof, due to Joyal, which is less known but of 
equal elegance and simplicity (Aigner and Ziegler 2004, p. 174). 
One proof stands out for its simplicity and elegance. It was found by Ernst Witt in 1931 
and combines two elementary ideas towards a glorious finish (Aigner and Ziegler 2004, p. 
23).12 
If mathematicians’ preference for simpler proofs is rational, then a preference for simpler 
deductive arguments more generally is rational as well. Why? Because mathematical proofs are 
arguments of the genus (Deduction) and species of the same genus usually share most of their 
properties in common except the property that makes them different species. For example, Homo 
sapiens, Homo habilis, and Homo erectus are species of the genus Homo. They share most of 
their properties in common except the property that makes them different species, which is taken 
to be primarily increased cranial capacity. 
If this is correct, then given that mathematical proofs are a species of the genus 
(Deduction) in virtue of being proofs (i.e., the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, 
necessitate the truth of the conclusion), it is reasonable to infer that they share most of their 
properties in common with other arguments of the genus (Deduction), such as the property of 
being better arguments when simpler than competing arguments. Now, granted that 
mathematicians prefer simpler proofs, and that their preference for simpler proofs is rational, it is 
reasonable to infer that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments of the 
genus (Deduction). 
                                                          
11 Commenting on Dufour’s Argument and Explanation in Mathematics (2013) at the conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (May 22-25, 2013), Aberdein mentions empirical results suggesting that 
“mathematicians who completed the study expected explanatory proofs to be precise, useful and not intricate. Or, in 
other words, simple, fruitful, and exact.” Available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/3646529/Commentary_on_Michel_Dufour_Argument_and_explanation_in_mathematics.  
12 See also the special issue of Foundations of Science on Mathematical Argumentation (vol. 14, issue 1-2), edited 
by Aberdein and Dove (2009). For example, according to Coleman (2009, p. 30), “One proof is better than another 
because it is more elegant, or informative, or shorter, or easier to follow, or less conceptually demanding, or more 
easily generalisable, or with less fuzzy details, or more direct, or more constructive, or even more novel…” 
(emphasis added). 
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To sum up, my argument in support of premise (1.1) runs as follows: 
(1.1a) If X and Y are species of genus G, then X and Y share most of their properties in 
common, except the property that makes them different species. 
(1.1b) Mathematical proofs and other deductive arguments are species of the genus 
(Deduction). 
Therefore, 
(1.1) If, other things being equal, simpler mathematical proofs are better, then, other 
things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better.13 
With this support for premises (1.1) and (1.2), I submit, the argument from mathematical proofs 
shows that, other things being equal, simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction) are better. 
 
4. An argument from scientific theories 
According to Baker (2011), “Many philosophers believe that, other things being equal, simpler 
theories are better.” This seems to be the case especially as far as scientific theories are 
concerned. For instance, as van Fraassen (1980, p. 87) writes: 
When a [scientific] theory is advocated, it is praised for many features other than 
empirical adequacy and strength: it is said to be mathematically elegant, simple, of great 
scope, complete in certain respects: also of wonderful use in unifying our account of 
hitherto disparate phenomena, and most of all, explanatory.14 
Now, the important question for present purposes is the following: are simpler arguments better 
(in much the same way that simpler theories are better, other things being equal)? Here is an 
argument for an affirmative answer to this question: 
(2.1) If, other things being equal, simpler scientific theories are better, then, other 
things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 
(2.2) Other things being equal, simpler scientific theories are better. 
Therefore, 
(2.3) Other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 
                                                          
13 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, (1.1a) is consistent with there being a particular property F of 
species X but not Y, which are both species of genus G, that is not the property that makes X and Y different species 
of G. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call this kind of argument “argument a pari” (as opposed to argument a 
contrario). According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 241), “These arguments deal with the application 
or nonapplication to another species of the same genus of what can be asserted about some particular species.” 
14 It is worth noting that, for van Fraassen, these features are merely pragmatic, not epistemic or truth-conducive. I 
will return to this point in Section 5. 
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In support of premise (2.2) consider how, like mathematicians’ preference for simpler 
mathematical proofs, scientists’ preference for simpler scientific theories is quite evident from 
scientific practice.15 If scientists’ preference for simpler theories is rational, then a preference for 
simpler arguments more generally is rational as well. Why? Because scientific theories are a 
species of the genus (Deduction). 
To see why scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction), note that 
philosophers of science generally agree that successful scientific theories do not merely describe 
phenomena but rather explain them. In other words, successful scientific theories are 
explanations. As Godfrey-Smith (2003, p. 190) puts it: 
Science aims to tell us, and often succeeds in telling us, what the world is like. But it is 
also common to think that science tells us why things happen; we learn from science not 
just what goes on but why it does. Science apparently seeks to explain as well as describe 
(emphasis in original). 
For example, the Alvarez Asteroid Impact theory is supposed to be an explanation for the K-T 
extinction. The theory of evolution by natural selection is supposed to be an explanation for 
biological diversity. The general theory of relativity is supposed to be an explanation for what we 
call gravity. Now, the obvious question is this: what are explanations? Philosophers of science 
have proposed several answers. Which answer is the correct one is a matter of debate.16 Several 
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, however, construe explanations deductively. 
Take, for example, the unification account of explanation. According to Kitcher (1989, p. 448), 
“all explanation is deductive.” More explicitly, Kitcher argues that an explanation consists of an 
argument pattern, which is an ordered triple composed of a schematic argument (i.e., a sequence 
of schematic sentences, where a schematic sentence is a sentence in which non-logical terms 
have been replaced with letters), a set of filling instructions for each term in the schematic 
argument (i.e., instructions for filling in the letters in schematic sentences), and a classification 
of the schematic argument (i.e., a description of the premises, conclusions, and rules of inference 
used in the schematic argument).17 
For instance, consider the argument pattern Kitcher (1993, p. 83) labels “Common 
Descent”: 
Question: Why do the members of G, G` share P? 
Answer: 
(1) G, G` are descended from a common ancestor G0. 
(2) G0 members had P. 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Baker (2007), Forster and Sober (1994), and Glynn (2010). 
16 For a useful overview of philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, see Woodward (2011). 
17 An earlier account that identifies scientific explanations with deductive arguments is the Deductive-Nomological 
account (Hempel 1965). 
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(3) P is heritable. 
(4) No factors intervened to modify P along the G0-G, G0-G` sequences. 
Therefore, (5) Members of G and G` have P. 
As Kitcher (1993, p. 83) explains: 
This consists of five schematic sentences. We could equip it with Filling Instructions by 
requiring that G, G`, G0 be replaced by names of groups of organisms, and that P be 
replaced by the name of a trait of organisms. Similarly, the classification would declare 
that (1)-(4) are premises and that (5) is deduced from them (emphasis added). 
If Kitcher is right, then to explain is to derive descriptions of various phenomena by using as few 
argument patterns as possible. As Kitcher (1989, p. 423) puts it, “Science advances our 
understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many phenomena, using the 
same pattern of derivation again and again, and in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to 
reduce the number of facts we have to accept as ultimate” (emphasis added). 
To sum up, then, from the following claims: 
Scientific theories are explanations. 
Explanations are a species of the genus (Deduction). 
It follows that 
  Scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction). 
If this is correct, then given that scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction) in 
virtue of being derivations (i.e., the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, necessitate the 
truth of the conclusion), it is reasonable to infer that they share most of their properties in 
common with other arguments of the genus (Deduction), such as the property of being better 
arguments when simpler than competing arguments. Now, granted that scientists prefer simpler 
explanations, and hence simpler scientific theories, and that their preference for simpler theories 
is rational, it is reasonable to infer that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler 
arguments of the genus (Deduction). 
To sum up, my argument for premise (2.1) runs as follows: 
(2.1a) If X and Y are species of genus G, then X and Y share most of their properties in 
common, except the property that makes them different species. 
(2.1b) Scientific theories and other deductive arguments are species of the genus 
(Deduction). 
Therefore, 
(2.1) If, other things being equal, simpler scientific theories are better, then, other 
things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 
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With this support for premises (2.1) and (2.2), I submit, the argument from scientific theories 
shows that, other things being equal, simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction) are better. 
Some might object to the argument from scientific theories by insisting that, pace Kitcher, 
scientific explanations, and hence scientific theories, are not species of the genus (Deduction). 
They might point out that one form of non-deductive reasoning that is taken to be ubiquitous in 
scientific practice is Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), which is a form of argument of the 
genus (Induction), given that the premises of an IBE, if true, do not guarantee the truth of its 
conclusion.18 
In reply, I would like to suggest that this objection actually provides a way to extend the 
argument from scientific theories to arguments of the genus (Induction) as well.19 To see how, 
consider the general form of IBE (Govier 2010, p. 302): 
1. D exists. 
2. H1 would explain D. 
3. H1 would offer the best available explanation of D. 
Therefore, probably, 
4. H1 is true. [Where “D refers to data, and H1 refers to a hypothesis put forward in an 
attempt to explain that data” (Govier 2010, p. 298).]20 
The key premise of an IBE, of course, is the third premise. What makes one explanation the best 
among several competing explanations? Philosophers of science have identified the following 
epistemic desiderata, the so-called “theoretical virtues,” which make one explanation better than 
others: “accuracy, simplicity, internal and external consistency, breadth of scope, and 
fruitfulness” (Longino 1995, p. 383).21 Notice that one of those theoretical virtues is simplicity, 
which means that, of two competing explanations, H1 and H2, the simpler one is the best one, 
other things being equal. 
If this is correct, then the third premise of an IBE is true insofar as H1 is simpler than a 
competing explanation, H2. From this it follows that an IBE for H1 is better than an IBE for H2 
insofar as the third premise of the former is true, whereas the third premise of the latter is not. In 
other words, arguments of the genus (Induction), namely IBEs, are better when the explanations 
they are arguments for are simpler than competing explanations. 
                                                          
18 On IBE, see Lipton (2004). Cf. Bird (2007) who argues that there is a form of IBE, namely, inference to the only 
explanation, in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 
19 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
20 Cf. Psillos (2007, pp. 442-443). 
21 Cf. Kuhn (1977, pp. 320-339). 
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Now, if IBEs are better when the explanations they are arguments for are simpler than 
competing explanations, and IBEs are a species of the genus (Induction), then it follows that 
simpler arguments of the genus (Induction) are better by (2.1a). More explicitly: 
(2.1a) If X and Y are species of genus G, then X and Y share most of their properties in 
common, except the property that makes them different species. 
(3.1) IBEs and other inductive arguments are species of the genus (Induction). 
Therefore, 
(3.2) If, other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better, then, other things being equal, 
simpler inductive arguments are better. 
With this argument for (3.2), it follows that simpler arguments of the genus (Induction) are 
better, since, other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better. That is: 
(3.2) If, other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better, then, other things being equal, 
simpler inductive arguments are better. 
(3.3) Other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better. 
Therefore, 
(3.4) Other things being equal, simpler inductive arguments are better. 
Given (2.3) and (3.4), then, it follows that simpler arguments are better. That is, of two 
competing arguments, A1 and A2, if A1 is simpler than A2, then A1 is a better argument than A2. 
So, from the following claims: 
Other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. [(2.3)] 
Other things being equal, simpler inductive arguments are better. [(3.4)] 
It follows that 
Other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. 
Accordingly, of two competing arguments, A1 and A2, if A1 is simpler than A2, we should prefer 
A1 over A2. 
 
5. An argument from the conjunction rule 
Some might object to the argument from mathematical proofs and the argument from scientific 
theories by insisting that simplicity—either (Elegance) or (Parsimony)—is a pragmatic, not an 
epistemic, virtue. For instance, in the philosophy of science, constructive empiricists distinguish 
between pragmatic and epistemic virtues of scientific theories and argue that simplicity is a 
pragmatic, not an epistemic, virtue of scientific theories. As van Fraassen (1985, p. 252) writes: 
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A person may believe that a certain theory is true and explain that he does so, for instance, 
because it is the best explanation he has of the facts or because it gives him the most 
satisfying world picture. This does not make him irrational, but I take it to be part of 
empiricism to disdain such reasons (emphasis added). 
In other words, according to constructive empiricists, pragmatic virtues, like simplicity, are not 
truth-conducive, unless one holds a metaphysical belief in the simplicity of the world. As 
empiricists, however, constructive empiricists think that such a metaphysical belief is 
unwarranted. As van Fraassen (1980, p. 90) puts it, “it is surely absurd to think that the world is 
more likely to be simple than complicated (unless one had certain metaphysics or theological 
views not usually accepted as legitimate factors in scientific inference).” Inspired by constructive 
empiricism, then, some might object to the argument from mathematical proofs and the argument 
from scientific theories by claiming that principles like (Elegance) and (Parsimony) are not 
truth-conducive because “it is surely absurd to think that the world is more likely to be simple 
than complicated” (van Fraassen 1980, p. 90). 
Although I have taken the rationality of mathematicians’ preference for simpler 
mathematical proofs and scientists’ preference for simpler scientific theories as basic premises in 
my arguments from mathematical proofs and scientific theories, respectively, I would like to 
offer another argument for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better 
by way of a response to the aforementioned objection. This argument, if cogent, shows that one 
can accept that, other things being equal, simpler argument are better, without a commitment to a 
metaphysical belief in the simplicity of the world, a belief that constructive empiricists find 
unwarranted. 
To introduce this argument, I need to take a short detour through what Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) call “the conjunction fallacy” in probability judgments. In their famous study, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) presented the following case to participants: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Which is more probable? 
(L1) Linda is a bank teller. 
(L2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
Most participants choose (L2), even though (L2) is less probable than (L1), given that two 
conditions must hold in order for (L2) to be true, namely, that Linda is a bank teller and that she 
is active in the feminist movement, whereas only one of them must hold for (L1) to be true, 
namely, that she is a bank teller. More generally, for any two events, A and B, Pr(A & B) ≤ Pr(A) 
and Pr(A & B) ≤ Pr(B). 
Although (L2) is less probable, it appears that most people find (L2) more plausible. As 
Tversky and Kahneman’s study show, an account rich in details often seems more plausible to 
people, even though the more details the account contains, the less probable it is, since the 
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probability of the conjunction of all the details is lower than the probability of each detail (by the 
conjunction rule). Accordingly, even though it may seem that an account rich in details is more 
probable, that is not the case. An account rich in details only seems more probable, because it is 
more plausible, but it is actually less probable, given that the more details the account contains, 
the less probable it is, since the probability of the conjunction of all the details is lower than the 
probability of each detail (by the conjunction rule). 
Likewise, an argument rich in details (i.e., rich in premises) might seem better than an 
argument with fewer premises, even though the more details (i.e., more premises) the argument 
contains, the probability that it is a sound argument (i.e., a valid argument with true premises) is 
lower, since the probability of the conjunction of all the details (i.e., all the premises) is lower 
than the probability of each premise (by the conjunction rule). With this understanding of the 
conjunction rule, and the distinction between probability and plausibility, the following argument 
from the conjunction rule for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are 
better can be made: 
(4.1) According to the conjunction rule, for any two competing arguments, A1 with 
premise P, and A2 with premises P and Q, Pr(P & Q) ≤ Pr(P) and Pr(P & Q) ≤ 
Pr(Q). 
(4.2) Given the conjunction rule, of two competing arguments, it is rational to prefer 
the simpler one (i.e., the argument with fewer premises), other things being equal. 
Therefore, 
(4.3) Of two competing arguments, it is rational to prefer the simpler one (i.e., the 
argument with fewer premises), other things being equal. 
In other words, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments, i.e., arguments 
with fewer premises. If A1 has fewer premises than A2, then we should prefer A1 over A2, other 
things being equal. The conclusion of this argument from the conjunction rule applies to 
arguments of the genus (Induction) as well as to arguments of the genus (Deduction) and there 
is no need to assume “that the world is more likely to be simple than complicated” (van Fraassen 
1980, p. 90). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other 
words, I have argued that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over 
less simple ones. I have sketched three arguments in support of this claim. According to the first 
argument, if simpler mathematical proofs are better, other things being equal, then simpler 
argument of the genus (Deduction) are better, other things being equal. According to the second 
argument, if simpler scientific theories are better, other things being equal, then simpler 
arguments of the genus (Deduction) are better, other things being equal. I have extended this 
argument from scientific theories to arguments of the genus (Induction) as well on the grounds 
that, if simpler IBEs are better, other things being equal, then simpler arguments of the genus 
14 
 
(Induction) are better, other things being equal. According to the third argument, the 
conjunction rule implies that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments, 
i.e., arguments with fewer premises. 
Admittedly, there are many questions that stem from the aforementioned arguments, 
which I have not addressed in this paper. For example, how do we rank arguments according to 
simplicity? How do we distinguish between simplicity of arguments and simplicity of statements 
that serve as premises and conclusions of arguments? There are more questions that need be 
addressed, I am sure, but that will have to wait for another occasion.22 Far from being a problem, 
I take this to be a virtue of the arguments put forth in this paper, since, in addition to simplicity, 
fruitfulness is often considered a theoretical virtue of both mathematical proofs and scientific 
theories. 
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